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The Alexander Brothers Trial: What 18 U.S.C. § 1591 Requires—and Why Count Two Falls Short

A close reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 suggests Count Two was not established.

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Daniel Mael
Feb 12, 2026
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On February 10, 2026, federal prosecutors put Lindsey Acree on the stand in their case against Tal Alexander. She is the only witness backing Count Two of the indictment, which accuses him of forcing her into a commercial sex act in May 2011. After a full day of testimony, the central question was straightforward: did the government actually prove the crime it decided to charge?

Count two of the federal indictment of the Alexander Brothers.

Count Two is not a rape charge. It alleges sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. To convict, prosecutors must show that the defendant caused someone to engage in a “commercial sex act,” meaning a sex act carried out “on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” That language matters. “On account of” requires a real link between the alleged benefit and the sex act itself. If that link is missing, the statute does not apply.

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